Abstract. Telecare medicine information system (TMIS) provides a convenient and efficient communicating platform for patients at home and physicians at medical clinics. To protect the information of patients and servers secret, a series of authentication schemes for TMIS have been proposed. Recently, Debasis et al. proposed an RSA-based remote user authentication for TMIS. Meanwhile, they claimed that their scheme can resist various attacks. Unluckily, after analyzed Debasis et al.'s scheme, we find that their scheme cannot resist some attacks. Besides, if an adversary has guessed the patient's password, he/she can compute the session key between the patient and server. In order to enhance the security of authentication scheme for TMIS, we propose a new scheme based on extended chaotic map. Compared with the previous schemes, our scheme not only possesses robust security, but also has better efficiency.
Introduction
With the advancement of information and communication technologies, telecare provides convenience for remote medical and health care services. In last few decades, telecare medicine information system (TMIS) enables telecare come into being, patient at home can send his/her health information to his/her doctor and the doctor can make corresponding guidance according to the patient's physical condition. Moreover, due to the openness of internet, it is vital to protect patient's personal information and services of remote medical from being attack. In order to ensure the privacy mentioned above and enhance the efficiency for TMIS, remote authentication scheme become more important.
So far, a number of authenticated key agreement schemes [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] for TMIS have been proposed. In 2012, Wu et al. [7] proposed a discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [18] based authentication scheme for TMIS. They claimed that their scheme can resist a range of attacks. Meanwhile, they enhanced the efficiency by introducing a pre-computing phase. Nevertheless, He et al. [8] found that Wu et al.'s scheme cannot resist impersonation attack and insider attack. To overcome these disadvantages, they presented a new scheme. Later on, Wei et al. [9] discovered both the schemes [7, 8] are vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack. Therefore, they proposed an improved protocol. Unfortunately, Zhu [10] found that Wei et al.'s protocol still cannot resist off-line password guessing attack in 2012. To enhance the security of remote authentication scheme for TMIS, a RSA-based efficient authentication scheme was proposed by Zhu. In 2013, Khan and Kumari [11] pointed out that both Wei et al. and Zhu's schemes suffer from inefficacy of password change phase, untraceability and denial of service attack. To remove these defects, they proposed their scheme for TMIS. Nevertheless, Debasis et al. [12] indicated that Khan and Kumari's scheme does not resist off-line password guessing attack and they proposed an efficient and robust RSA-based remote user authentication for TMIS.
As mentioned above, these early schemes can be further classified into two categories. One is based on symmetric key cryptography and the other is based on public key cryptography. In the recent years, Chebyshev chaotic map is widely applied to authentication and key agreement schemes for its better performance than the traditional cryptography. In 2001, Xiao et al. [13] introduced the first chaotic map based authenticated key agreement protocol. Up to now, a series of chaotic map based authentication schemes [14, 15, 16, 17] were proposed for TMIS. On the basis of the development of cryptography, we find that Debasis et al.'s [12] scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, impersonation attack. Moreover, their scheme can not to provide perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we will propose a new authentication scheme based on extended chaotic maps [19] to rectify these weaknesses.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section presents "Review of Debasis et al.'s scheme". The section "Cryptanalysis of Debasis et al.'s scheme" is about weaknesses of Debasis et al.'s scheme. Subsequently, we present our new scheme in section "The proposed scheme". "Security analysis" and "Summary" will be introduced respectively in section 6 and 7.
Review of Debasis et al's Scheme Registration Phase
Step 
Step 2. After receiving the message  
smart card and sends it to i U via the secure channel.
Step 3. On receiving the smart card from S , i U saves i b on his/her smart card.
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are equal, S is authenticated to the patient i U . Then, both patient i U and the server S agrees upon a common secret session key
Cryptanalysis of Debasis et al.'s Scheme
Off-Line Password Guessing Attack
Step 1. The adversary A selects a candidate * i pw .
Step 2. Then he/she can compute
Step 3. Finally, he/she checks whether * i C is equal to i C or not. If yes, password is guessed successfully. Otherwise, the adversary A repeats the operations (1-3) until the correct password is found. Eventually, the correct password can be guessed.
After guessing correct password can be further calculated.
User Impersonation Attack
Step 1. He/She generates a random number 1 N and calculates
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, then transmits the message
Step 3. A recovers 2 N  and computes SK . As a result, communication between A and S will not be confidential.
Forward Secrecy Attack
Step 1. The adversary computes
, where i ID is transmitted on public channel.
Step 2. After that, he/she computes   mod ,
Step 3. The session key  
can be computed now. Therefore, Debasis et al.'s scheme cannot protect user's forward secrecy.
The Proposed Scheme

Initialization Phase
The server S first chooses a master secret key mk and a random variable x , where ) ,
. After that, he/she chooses a one-way hash function ) ( h .
Registration Phase
Step . After that, he/she submits ( ,
ID pwb to S through a secure channel.
Step 2. After receiving the message ( ,
Then he/she issues a smart card which contains the information i L and   h  to i U .
Step 3. 
Login and Authentication Phase
Step 1. 
, where 1 T is the current timestamp. Finally,
IM DID T x T to server S .
Step 2. S verifies the validity of 1 T and calculates
. If they are not equal, S rejects this service request. Otherwise, S generates a random number S and computes
Password Change Phase
Step 1. Step 2. The smart card computes
Step 3. Finally, updates i L with * i L on the smart card.
Security Analysis of Our Proposed Scheme
Mutual Authentication
Mutual authentication means that user and server can verify the identity of each other before releasing patient's secret information, such as name, age, telephone number and so on. In our scheme, when server receives the login request   , , s IM T x T from server, only the server with correct master key can be verified by the user. As a result, our scheme can achieve mutual authentication.
Off-line Password Guessing Attack
Assume that an adversary steals or picks up a smart card and extracts all information
. Unfortunately, he/she has no method to get patient's identity i ID and server's master key mk . Therefore, it is impossible for the adversary to guess patient's password. Even if the adversary has intercepted all the authentication information, he/she still is not able to guess the patient's password. Therefore, our scheme can resist off-line password guessing attack.
Privileged Insider Attack
In our scheme, when a patient wants to register himself/herself in a telecare server, he/she generates a random number bi and computes . After that, he/she submits i pwb to the server instead of i PW . Since the privileged insider cannot obtain the random number i b , he/she is not able to retrieve patient's password. That is to say our scheme is secure against the privileged insider attack
Perfect forward Secrecy
In our scheme, the session key     
Impersonation Attack
If an adversary A wants to impersonation to be a legal user, he/she has to calculate 1 IM to prove his/her legitimacy. However, it is impossible for the adversary to do it. Because he/she can not get the patient's identity, password and the random number r . That is to say, the adversary has no method to compute . We can say our scheme can resist impersonation attack.
Summary
In this paper, we first review Debasis et al.'s scheme. Later on, we analyze their protocol and show that their protocol is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, impersonation attack and forward secrecy attack. In order to improve the security and efficiency, we present a new chaotic map based authentication scheme for TMIS. According to the security analysis, our protocol is more secure than Debasis et al.'s scheme. Obviously, compared with some other related works, our protocol is more efficient for extend chaotic map's better performance than traditional cryptography. Therefore, our scheme is more suitable for TMIS.
